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I. INTRODUCTION
"Silence," the King of the Turtles barked back, "I'm king, and
you're only a turtle named Mack."1
The authority an employer exercises over an employee's continued
job security is substantial. As a result, this relationship implicitly rec-
ognizes "that not every act of insubordination or misconduct ethically
justifies an employer in firing [an] employee .. ". . ' When discharge
* LL.M., Georgetown University, 1991; J.D., Nova University Law Center,
1989.
1. Davis v. Williams, 598 F.2d 916, 917 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting SUESS, YERTLE
THE TURTLE AND OTHER STORIES (1950)).
2. Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611, 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (quot-
ing Resilient Floor & Decorative Covering Workers, Local Union 1179 v, Welco Mfg.
Co., 542 F.2d 1029, 1033 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976)); Note, Protecting Employees At Will
1
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does occur it is recognized to be an extreme industrial penalty since the
employee's job, benefits and reputation are at stake.3 To some commen-
tators, discharge is the equivalent of industrial capital punishment.
Yet, employees in the United States encounter dramatically dispa-
rate levels of protection against the risk of wrongful discharge. On one
hand, those covered by a collective bargaining agreement and those
employed by the federal, state and local governments enjoy substantial
protection and can only be discharged for "just cause."15 On the other
hand, those working for an indefinite or unspecified term of employ-
ment are considered to be employees at-will. Under this doctrine, either
party may terminate the employment relationship at any time or for
any reason. 6 The resulting inequity becomes readily apparent since the
rule permits an employer to discharge a long-term employee without
regard to the years of satisfactory performance or the substantial op-
portunities the employee may have foregone to remain in the em-
ployer's service.7 Thus, the common law "at-will" doctrine allows any
employee under no specific term of employment or statutory protection
to be discharged by his employer for good cause, bad cause, or for no
cause at all without concern for legal liability. Despite marked im-
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931
(1983). The condition of the modern employee has been described as follows:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for
our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely
dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource,
except for the relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such
dependence of the mass of the people upon others for all of their income is
something new in the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in
another man's hands.
Thomas G. Lemley, Note, Employment At Will: Missouri Recognizes the Public Pol-
icy Exception, 52 Mo. L. REV. 677 (1987) (quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY
OF LABOR 9 (1951)) (emphasis in original).
3. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 616 (4th
ed. 1985).
4. Id.
5. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty
To Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980). In the federal
sector, the employer agency must demonstrate some nexus between the conduct war-
ranting discharge and the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1988).
6. Smith v. Piezo Tech. and Prof. Admin., 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983);
Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
7. See supra, note 5.
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provements in federal legislation protecting employee rights,8 workers
in Florida not covered by a collective bargaining agreement or individ-
ual employment contract enjoy only limited protections.9 Furthermore,
the Florida courts have significantly compounded the problem by con-
sistently refusing to extend additional protection for workers in the ab-
8. E.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7116 (1988) (protecting
federal employees from discharge for exercising rights under the title); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-2a (1988) (protecting employ-
ees from discriminatory discharges); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(a), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988)(protecting employees while engaged in protected activity); Age
Discrimination Act of 1967, § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988) (prohibiting dismissal
of persons within the protected class); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, §
I I(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1)(1988) (prohibiting discharge or discrimination against
any employee for filing a complaint under this chapter); Railway Labor Act of 1926, §
2 Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1988)(prohibiting interference by employers for
protected activity).
9. FLA. STAT. § 40.271 (1991) (prohibiting discharge because of service on a
jury); FLA. STAT. § 61.1301(2)0)1 (1991) (prohibiting discharge against an employee
because of an income deduction order); FLA. STAT. § 104.081 (1991) (prohibiting dis-
charge for voting or not voting in any election); FLA. STAT. § 110.105(2) (1991)
(prohibiting discrimination in state employment based upon sex, age, race, religion,
national origin, political affiliation, marital status or handicap); FLA. STAT. §
112.042(1) (1991) (prohibiting discharge or discrimination by county or municipal em-
ployers on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, religious creed); The
Drug Free Workplace Act, FLA. STAT. § I12.0455(8)(p)-(t) (1991) (prohibiting em-
ployee discharge on the basis of prior medical history or who is voluntarily seeking
drug rehabilitative treatment); FLA. STAT. § 112.044(3)(a)l (1991) (prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment because of age); The Whistle-blower's Act of 1986, FLA.
STAT. § I 12.3187(4)(a) (199 1) (prohibiting discharge of an agency or independent con-
tractor for disclosing information pursuant to this section); The Police Officer's Bill of
Rights, FLA. STAT. § 112.532(5) (1991) (prohibiting discharge of a law enforcement
officer for exercising rights guaranteed under the statute); The Firefighter's Bill of
Rights, FLA. STAT. § 112.82(9) (1991) (prohibiting discharge of firefighter for exercise
of rights guaranteed under the statute); FLA. STAT. § 250.481 (1991) (prohibiting dis-
charge because of armed forces reserve obligations); FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1991) (cre-
ating a statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge for employee's pursuit of a
workers' compensation claim); FLA. STAT. § 447.17(1) (1991) (action for discrimina-
tion based on membership in a labor union); FLA. STAT. § 447.501(1)(b) (1991)
(prohibiting certain employer unfair labor practices for public employees); FLA. STAT. §
448.07(2) (1991) (action for wage discrimination on the basis of sex); FLA. STAT. §
448.075 (1991) (prohibiting discharge or discrimination solely because individual has
sickle-cell trait); The Human Rights Act of 1977, FLA. STAT. § 760.10(l)(a) (1991)
(prohibiting discharge or discrimination in private employment on the race, color, reli-
gion, sex, national origin, age, handicap or marital status); FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (1991)
(prohibiting discharge or discrimination on the basis of or belief that the individual has
taken an HIV test or is infected with the HIV virus).
1992] 1081
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sence of specific legislative enactments, even when the employer's ac-
tion can only be described as unconscionable.1" As justification for this
lack of intervention, the Florida courts assert that to overrule long-
standing Florida law would create uncertainty in present employer-em-
ployee relationships and would be contrary to one of the basic functions
of the law which is "to foster certainty in business relationships.""
Yet:
[I]n a civilized state where reciprocal legal rights and duties
abound the words "at will" can never mean "without limit or quali-
fication" . . . for in such a state the rights of each person are nec-
essarily and inherently limited by the rights of others and the inter-
ests of the public. An at will prerogative without limits could be
suffered only in an anarchy, and not there for long-it certainly
cannot be suffered in a society such as ours without weakening the
bond of counterbalancing rights and obligations that holds such so-
cieties together . . . .[T]here can be no right to terminate such
[an employment] contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that
contravenes public policy. A different interpretation would en-
courage and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very nature is
10. Bellamy v. Holcomb, 577 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (em-
ployee discharged after subpoena of employer's wage and hour records); Scott v. Es-
talella, 563 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (Florida statute protecting em-
ployees from discharge for jury service "in this state" did not apply to jury service in
federal courts in Florida); Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Lab., Inc., 552 So. 2d 241
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (subpoenaed employee terminated for testifying truth-
fully against employer); Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (no cause of action for fired employee who refused to serve intoxicated
patron, even though state statute prohibits serving habitual drunkards); Ponton v.
Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), petition for rev. denied, 478 So. 2d
54 (1985) (no common law cause of action based upon public policy under state or
federal sex discrimination laws when female's rejection of sexual advances is motiva-
tion underlying her termination from employment). Contra Newsday, Inc. v. Long Is-
land Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S.
Ct. 1314 (1991) (arbitrator's award properly vacated as violative of explicit, well-de-
fined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment). Accord DeMarco v. Pub-
lix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980) (no wrongful discharge action for
employee who was terminated for failure to withdraw daughter's injury suit); Hartley
v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no cause of
action against employer for employee refusing to violate federal and state environmen-
tal statutes and regulations); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
11. Hartley, 476 So. 2d at 1329; Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d
266, 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The court's statement ignores the fact that the
courts can narrowly circumscribe a public policy exception to avoid uncertainty.
1082 [Vol. 16
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designed to discourage and prevent.' 2
By refusing to modify an outmoded nineteenth century principle in
addressing twentieth century problems, the Florida judiciary perpetu-
ates the uncertainty that it seeks to avoid. This article examines the
underpinnings and development of the employment at-will doctrine as
it expanded in the United States and in Florida, and focuses on the
cases of Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Laboratories, 3 and Bellamy
v. Holcomb. 4 This article concludes that the Florida Supreme Court
should now recognize a narrow public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine in light of the inequity of the Jarvinen and Bel-
lamy decisions and further examines how other courts approach this
issue, along with the theoretical basis for adopting such a policy. Fi-
nally, this article proposes specific statutory reforms for adoption by
the Florida Legislature.
II. EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL IN THE UNITED STATES
Commentators agree that the growth of the at-will doctrine can be
traced to several developments during the late nineteenth century. The
first factor involved the decline of the American courts in following the
traditional English rule of employment.' 5 While previously, the master
bore the customary responsibility for the servant's health and well-be-
12. J. Michael McGuinness, The Doctrine of Wrongful Discharge in North Car-
olina: The Confusing Path from Sides to Guy and the Need for Reform, 10 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 217 (1988) (quoting Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (N.C. Ct.
App.), rev. denied, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
13. 552 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
14. 577 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
15. Amy D. Ronner, Comment, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet: The Narrow
Public Policy Exception to the Terminable-At-Will Rule, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 565
(1984). The employment at will doctrine supplanted English employment law. The
Statute of Labourers provided that
no master can put away his servant during or at the end of his term of
employment and that apprentices could be dismissed only upon reasonable
cause. The statute influenced the English courts and the law of employ-
ment relations. The courts determined that when an employment contract
contained the mention of an annual salary, the employer implicitly agreed
to a one-year term of employment unless there was reasonable cause to
discharge.
Id. at 566-67 (citations omitted); see I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 1425 (1783). Consequently, the rule made it difficult for an employer to
dismiss an employee without breaching the contract and incurring liability.
1992] 1083
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ing, the new employment theory supposed that by entering into a wage
bargain, workers assumed the risk of on-the-job injuries." The second
factor entailed the willingness of the courts to recast the traditional
employment relationship in terms of the emerging theory of contracts."a
Third, with the advent of the industrial revolution, the courts favored a
laissez-faire attitude concerning the employment relationship in order
to further economic growth."8 Fourth, the emergence of Horace Wood's
16. Note, supra note 5, at 1824-25.
As the nineteenth century progressed and society became more commer-
cial, the relationship between master and servant changed. The "law of
master and servant," being originally premised on a personal, often famil-
ial relationship under the category of domestic relations, was no longer
suitable for employment that was commercial and involved large number
of employees. With these changes in society, the application of the "set-
tled" [English rule] no longer produced judicious results.
See David P. Weiss, Note, Public Policy Limitations to the Employment At-Will Doc-
trine Since Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 1115, 1117
(1983) (citations omitted). Hence, the courts were no longer capable of dealing with
the new commercial employer-employee relationship. Consequently, the courts utilized
the new emerging theory of contracts to define the employment relationship.
17. Note, supra note 5, at 1824-25.
The principal consequence of this conceptual change was a drastic limita-
tion in the employer's duties to the employee . . . . According to this for-
malistic approach, if the parties had intended the employment relationship
to last for one year, they would have made that an express term of the
contract.
Id. This approach relies upon two predominant theories in the late nineteenth century.
First, "that manifestations of assent must be evidenced by definite, express terms if
promises are to be enforceable. Thus, an employer's absolute discretion to terminate
had to be presumed unless some definite duration was specified in the employment
contract." Id. at 1825. Secondly, there must be mutuality of contract. "Mutuality of
contract requires that both parties are bound or neither is bound to the contract. Sym-
metry is the crux of this definition of mutuality. Accordingly, terminable at-will em-
ployment contracts are valid because neither party is bound to the agreement." David
Peck, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At-Will Rule: Illinois Creates
and Amorphous Tort, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 247, 248 n.5 (1982). But several courts
and commentators have pointed out that the symmetry and logical appeal of the con-
tractual principle of mutuality of obligation has little or no legitimate economic justifi-
cation to at-will employment because it is based upon the false premise of relatively
equal bargaining power between employers and at-will employees. See Andre D. Bouf-
fard, Comment, Emerging Protection Against Retaliatory Discharge: A Public Policy
Exception To The Employment At-Will Doctrine In Maine, 38 ME. L. REV. 67, 70 n.7
(1986).
18. See Ronner, supra note 15, at 567.
The laissez-faire concept was based on the assumption that the individual
1084 [Vol. 16
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1877 Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant, 9 provided the al-
ready receptive courts with an additional basis to adopt the at-will doc-
trine110 Recognized as a prolific treatise writer of his time, Wood's the-
ory stated that:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out
a. yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A
hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being speci-
fied, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was
for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the
party may serve. It is competent for either party to show what the
mutual understanding of the parties was in reference to the matter;
but unless their understanding was mutual that the service was to
extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite
should have complete social freedom to contract not only in his personal
affairs, but also in his business relationships. The new rule was ushered in
by the industrial revolution and its companion notions of social freedom
and freedom of contract. Under this contractual approach to employment,
the parties were bound only by obligations clearly intended; the parties set
their own terms and any implied obligations became secondary to the em-
ployees' basic freedoms.
George R. Arrants, Jr., Note, Labor Law-Employment At Will-Public Policy Excep-
tions to the Employment At Will Doctrine, 53 TENN. L. REV. 199, 203 n.22 (1985).
19. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134
(1877). One author writes that Wood himself was an enigma. He apparently was a
practicing attorney in Albany, New York, but was not a member of the New York
State Bar Association. In addition to his master and servant treatise, he edited or au-
thored treatises on nuisances, torts and evidence, among others. See Jay M. Feinman,
The Development of The Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 n.68
(1976). 'The Albany Law Journal said:
Mr. Wood obtained an excellent reputation as a learned, accurate and
original author ....
To bring order, simplicity and symmetry out of [the conflicting
decisions on master and servant] was the work of a man of genius, and this
we have before us.
15 ALB. L.J. 378-79, May 12, 1877; Feinman, supra note 68.
20. See Ronner, supra note 15, at 568.
The employment relationship in the late nineteenth century was considered
to be strictly contractual in nature and the absence of expressed terms or a
written contract created the at will arrangement. [Thus, the] contract
based theory was a repudiation of the English rule which required just
cause for termination of at will employment.
Arrants, supra note 18, at 203 n.23.
1992] 1085
7
De Nigris: The Public Policy Exception: The Need to Reform Florida's At-Will
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in this
respect there is no distinction between domestic and other
servants."
Wood's rule has been widely criticized as a misreading and distor-
tion of the law existing at the time. 2 A review of the authority relied
upon by Wood reveals four flaws with his "inflexible rule." First, it is
argued that Wood's treatment on the duration of service contracts
lacked comprehensiveness and concern for detail.2 3 Second, the four
American cases cited as authority for the at-will theory were in fact far
off the mark. 4 In actuality, two of the cases cited by Wood found job
21. WOOD, supra note 19, at 272 (citations omitted).
22. Feinman, The Development of The Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); Joseph De Giuseppe, Jr., The Recognition of Public Policy
Exceptions To Employment-At-Will Rule: A Legislative Function?, I I FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 721, 724 n.6 (1983); Rodney A. Max, A New Tort in Alabama: Wrongful Em-
ployment Termination in Violation of Public Policy, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 39, 40
n.6 (1988); Laurie Schober Carnahan, Note, Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co.: An Analy-
sis of the Wisconsin Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Rule and a
Call For Legislative Action, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 689, 691 n.17 (1987); accord Gregory
L. Grow, Note, Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford. Arkansas Adopts the Public Policy
Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 42 ARK. L. REv. 187, 190 n.26
(1989); Lemley, supra note 2, at 678 n.10; J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note,
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974); Weiss,
supra note 16, at 18 n.23.
23. Feinman, supra note 22, at 126.
24. Id.; see Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 341. The first case, DeBriar v.
Minturn, I Cal. 450 (1851), involved
the right of a discharged bartender to occupy a room in the tavern after he
had been notified to leave by the end of the month. Essentially an action
for unlawful ejection, the case touched only tangentially on the employ-
ment relationship. [The court] held only that the innkeeper had a right to
eject a person living in his house after proper notification.
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 342 n.54.
Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870), also contradicts
Wood's assertion. The court found that there was no error in allowing the
jury to determine the nature of the contract from written and oral commu-
nications, usages of the trade, the situation of the parties, the types of
employment and all other circumstances.
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 342 n.54.
In Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871), the court
found that indefinite duration by itself did not give the employer unfet-
tered discretion to dismiss an employee. A mining captain discharged at
the end of eight months was allowed to recover four additional months of
pay because he had been assured that employment would be stable. The
1086 [Vol. 16
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security rights in the absence of explicit provisions on the length of
employment.2 5 Third, Wood's rule revolved around his incorrect asser-
tion that no American court had approved the English rule in recent
years. He continued that the employment at-will rule was inflexibly ap-
plied in the United States and that the English rule was only a yearly
hiring, making no mention of notice.2" Lastly, even though unsupported
by legal precedent, Wood failed to offer any policy grounds for the
adoption of this theory. 7 Feinman argues that it is possible to attribute
too much influence to Wood himself. 8 However, he acknowledges that
treatises were an important tool to the bar and bench in this period.2 9
Therefore, a modern, comprehensive treatise stating a clear rule of
practical application would inevitably attract a wide following and be
cited as authority." While Wood's treatise could not have alone caused
the change to employment at-will, the rule would not have developed as
quickly and uniformly as it did without it. 31 Despite the lack of analysis
and authority, by the beginning of the twentieth century Wood's rule
jury thought that hiring for a year could be reasonably inferred from the
facts.
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 342 n.54.
Finally, Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other
grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1871), concerned a business contract between the
Army and private entrepreneurs for the transportation of goods; it had
nothing to do with general hirings as such. A business had an outdated
contract with an army quartermaster to transport goods across Minnesota
and, at a time when the quartermaster could obtain no other transporta-
tion, the company insisted on a new arrangement at a higher price. The
Supreme Court reversed a Court of Claims decision upholding the com-
pany's right to collect the additional price on grounds that the statute of
limitations on the claim had run.
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 342 n.54.
25. Feinman, supra note 22, at 126. Judge Meyer, in his dissenting opinion in
Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 95 (N.Y. 1983) (Meyer, J.,
dissenting), characterizes the New York court's adoption of.Wood's rule in Martin v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895), as bizarre in light of Wood's concession
of a yearly hiring in England; the Court of Appeals adoption of the English Rule and
the fact that Wood's rule was not supported by any of the cases cited by him.
26. Feinman, supra note 22, at 126.
27. Id.
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became the primary doctrine governing employment duration.3 2 Those
courts adopting Wood's rule did so by simply citing to Wood's treatise
or the cases cited by him directly. 33
32. Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 342.
33. Id. One commentator writes:
Although courts today often feel obliged to pay lip service to the legit-
imacy of the at will rule, legal scholars are increasingly likely to view the
rule as an anachronism. This conclusion follows from three sets of interre-
lated arguments, each suggesting that certain social, economic and institu-
tional conditions have change since 1877. First, economic power has be-
come increasingly concentrated in the hands of large, impersonal
employers. This not only endangers individual freedom by creating the po-
tential for employers to exploit employee vulnerability but also undermines
the traditional assumption that employees can negotiate the terms of their
employment contract using bargaining power equal to that of their em-
ployers. This does not conform to modern realities. At the time a job is
extended and accepted, little bargaining actually takes place, only the rare
employee can insist on negotiating terms of employment and the rest must
accept the terms and conditions of employment prevailing in the workplace
at the time of hire.
Second, the work force is no longer predominantly self employed and
as a result today's wage earner is often completely dependent on employ-
ment related income. This reveals the inadequacy of the contract principles
of freedom of choice and mutuality of rights. In this context, the em-
ployer's right to discharge employees at will becomes a right to impose
significant social, psychological and economic costs on employees without
providing justification. For the economically dependent employee who does
not feel free to quit, the right to withdraw from the employment contract
becomes a hollow right.
Third, employee expectations regarding employee rights generally and
job security specifically have changed during the course of this century.
Evidence of increasing employee dissatisfaction with the employment rela-
tionship and rising expectations regarding fair, nonarbitrary treatment is
revealed by opinion polls, surveys and a growing number of lawsuits. Em-
ployees now expect management to provide job related reasons when deci-
sions are made that affect their employment status. Evidence that norms of
workplace justice are changing is also reflected in arbitration decisions.
Arbitrators are increasingly insistent that procedural rules be observed and
increasingly reluctant to uphold employee discharges except as an option
of last resort. As a result it can no longer be suggested that employees, in
accepting a job offer, agree as part of the employment bargain that they
can be fired at will.
Fourth, contract principles are unsuited to modern institutional reali-
ties. Life in large scale organizations is characterized by a high degree of
interdependence. This requires cooperation among all of the organization's
members and a strong sense of commitment to the enterprise as well as
10
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An even more dramatic pronouncement of the at-will doctrine oc-
curred with the Supreme Court's decisions in Adair v. United States
3 4
and Coppage v. Kansas.3 5 Both cases gave the at-will doctrine constitu-
tional legitimacy. In those cases, the Supreme Court held that regula-
tion of the employment relationship violated the parties' freedom to
contract. These opinions represent the high water mark of the Court's
insistence on laissez-faire principles in the labor area, despite a growing
concern that freedom of contract was a cruel illusion because of the
extreme differences in bargaining power between employers and
employees.36
each other. Contract principles, premised on freedom of choice and limited
commitment, are ill suited for establishing the kind of employment rela-
tionship required by modern enterprises. Achieving harmony between legal
principles and institutional realities requires alternative principles of asso-
ciation premised on mutual obligation and increased commitment.
Tompkins, Legislating the Employment Relationship: Montana's Wrongful-Discharge
Law, 14 EMp. REL. L.J. 387 (1988) (citations omitted).
34. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In this case, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal
statute making it a criminal offense for an interstate carrier to discharge an employee
simply because of the employee's membership in a labor organization. The high court
concluded that the statute invaded the parties personal liberty and interfered with the
right to contract. The Court wrote:
In the absence, however, of a valid contract between the parties controlling
their conduct towards each other and fixing a period of service, it cannot
be, we repeat, that an employer is under any legal obligation, against his
will, to retain an employee in his personal service any more than an em-
ployee can be compelled, against his will, to remain in the personal service
of another.
Id. at 175.
Adair was overruled in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941);
see Richard D. Himberger, Comment, Unjust Discharge: Why Nonunion Employees
Need a Just Cause Statute, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 135 (1989).
35. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In Coppage, the Supreme Court invalidated a Kansas
statute that provided for a fine and imprisonment if an employer required an employee
to agree not to become or remain a member of any labor organization during the term
of employment. The Court then concluded that the employer's right to hire and fire at-
will was a property right protected by the Constitution.
Today, so called "yellow dog" contracts are specifically illegal under several stat-
utes. See, e.g., The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
36. Arrants, supra note 18, at 204; Himberger, supra note 34; Ronner, supra
note 15; see Note, Protecting Employees, supra note 2, at 1933; see also Note, Pro-
tecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1982.
From a historical perspective, the Supreme Court's laissez-faire intervention and
its attempts at restraining Congressional power to regulate the economy eventually
culminated in a showdown between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the High
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III. THE RULE DEVELOPS IN FLORIDA
The Florida courts were slow to expressly adopt Wood's rule after
its first pronouncement in 1877. Yet, early Florida cases suggest that
the doctrine was evolving.
In Chipley v. Atkinson,37 the plaintiff sued the defendant in an
action for tortious interference with a business relationship. Kehoe and
Walker employed Chipley as a superintendent at a brick manufactur-
ing business.38 His employment agreement included a provision that he
would be employed for a long period of time and that he had a "pros-
pect and promise of obtaining an interest in the business."39 The com-
pany dismissed Chipley after Atkinson convinced Kehoe and Walker
that Chipley was a thief.40 Chipley then commenced an action against
Atkinson."' At trial, the court charged the jury as to terminable at-will
employment as part of the proof Chipley needed to show in order to
prevail against Atkinson.42 The jury found for Chipley and awarded
Court. Ravaged by the throes of an economic depression, the Roosevelt New Deal pro-
gram was shattered by a series of judicial defeats. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933); see Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton Ry., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933).
In February, 1937, President Roosevelt wrote Congress calling for a reorganiza-
tion of the judicial branch or what has become known as the Roosevelt "Court Pack-
ing" plan. The plan proposed that for the appointment of additional judges to the fed-
eral bench for each judge over the age of seventy years who did not choose to retire. At
that time, six Justices on the Supreme Court had passed the voluntary retirement age.
The plan was rejected. However, within four years Roosevelt was able to replace all six
justices as a result of retirement. The new Court took essentially a hands off approach
on economic policy.
37. 1 So. 934 (Fla. 1887).
38. Id. at 935.
39. Id.
40. Id. Chipley never sued his former employers and named only Atkinson in the
action. The case makes no mention as to why Chipley chose not to sue the partners.
41. Id.
42. Chipley, I So. at 935. The court charged the jury that: "If you find that the
contract was not for a definite term, and there are no payments or other circumstances
to show that the hiring was from period to period, then it would be a hiring from day to
day, and terminable at the will of either party." Id. This instruction was not excepted
to by either party to the lawsuit. Nor is there any supporting authority found in the
case supporting this statement of the law.
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damages. The defendant filed exceptions to several of the jury charges.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court granted a new trial. The court
reasoned that the term "long period of time" created a jury question as
to the actual term of employment which suggested that Chipley could
not be discharged except for cause.'" Consequently, the jury would
have to determine the actual length of employment since this factor
controlled whether Chipley could maintain his action against
Atkinson."
Shortly after the turn of the century, the supreme court again ad-
dressed the issue of at-will employment in Savannah, F. &. W. Rail-
way Co. v. Willett."' In that case, Willett made an application for em-
ployment to the defendant after being solicited to apply for a
conductor's position. "' The defendant informed Willett that he would
be employed if he reported for duty at once.' 7 Willett resigned from his
job and reported to a Savannah, F. & W. station at the company's
direction. 48 After receiving his route assignment, Willett left the com-
pany's Sanford station and travelled to Kissimmee."9 Upon arrival at
the Kissimmee station, Willett was instructed to return to Sanford. The
43. Id. at 941. The court wrote:
An agreement between the plaintiff and Kehoe & Walker for the continu-
ance of the employment for a long period of time cannot be ignored as a
feature of the case. This allegation means that the agreement entered into
by them entitled the plaintiff, either expressly or by implication, to em-
ployment not only for a period of time, but for a long period. It means that
a period of time was agreed upon by them; and whatever the period thus
agreed on was, whether limited by months or years or otherwise, is to be
proved. The language implies that there was at least some point of time in
the future, ascertainable from the terms of the agreement, up to which the
employment was to extend.
Id.
44. The term of employment was critical since Chipley alleged that he was dis-
charged during his term of employment. This could only be done for just cause. If
Chipley was an at-will employee with no definite term, then he could be discharged at
any time for any reason. Accordingly, his claim for malicious interference with a busi-
ness relationship could not be maintained against Atkinson if he could be discharged
for no reason at all.
45. 31 So. 246 (1901).
46. Id. Willett had been employed as a conductor for nineteen years and sought
a better paying job with the Savannah, F. & W. Railway.
47. Id. The facts indicate that Willett took the Savannah position in order to
improve himself.
48. Id. Upon responding, Willett was examined and then assigned to a route.
49. Id. Willett travelled aboard one of the Savannah's trains to the new station.
19921 1,091
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company subsequently informed Willett on his return that he would not
be employed unless he obtained a release or recommendation from his
previous employer. When he could not obtain the recommendation,
Willett was fired. 50 Willett sued the railroad. The case went to trial
resulting in a verdict for Willett and Savannah appealed.5 1
The supreme court reversed the verdict and judgment. The court
held that since Willett alleged no facts as to the duration of employ-
ment, the employment was at-will and terminable by either party. In
its analysis, the court cited several cases and Wood's rule.52 Each of the
cases cited by the court were reminiscent of Wood's misapplication of
the actual holdings and lack of analysis.5 3
50. Savannah, 31 So. at 246. The railway had not previously asked for this re-
lease or recommendation at the time it solicited Willett to work for them. Furthermore,
the company was aware that Willett was working for another railroad and that he took
the Savannah position in order to improve himself and for an increase in salary. The
evidence before the court showed that Willett had faithfully and diligently performed
his duties in the nineteen years that he had been a conductor. As a result of Savannah's
actions, Willett was unable to obtain employment for twelve months.
51. Id. at 247. Willett claimed $1500.00 in damages. The jury awarded $744.83.
Id. at 246-47.
52. Id. at 247.
53. Id. The court first cited to Blaisdell v. Lewis, 32 Me. 515 (1851). In that
case, Blaisdell sued alleging that Lewis failed to hire him as promised. There was no
time stipulated as to the duration of the service. Subsequently, Lewis never hired Blais-
dell and was sued for the amount of money that Blaisdell would have made had he
been hired. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Maine Supreme Court re-
versed the verdict holding that because there was no fixed period of time of when Blais-
dell's employment was to begin, there was no contract. The court then wrote in dicta
that had Blaisdell gone to work, there was nothing to prevent Lewis from discharging
him on that day. The Maine Supreme Court never cited any other precedent in its
holding.
Today, the efficacy of the Blaisdell holding is dwindling with the Maine Supreme
Court's recent pronouncement in Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d
97 (Me. 1984). In that case, the court indicated that it would not rule out the possible
recognition of a public policy cause of action when the discharge contravenes some
strong public policy. See, Andre D. Bouffard, Comment, Emerging Protection Against
Retaliatory Discharge: A Public Policy Exception To The Employment At-Will Doc-
trine In Maine, 38 ME. L. REv. 67 (1986).
De Briar v. Minturn, I Cal. 450 (1851), the second case relied upon by the Florida
Supreme Court, and previously rejected as a misstatement, was blindly cited by the
court. The court then cited directly to Wood's treatise.
Commissioners v. Brown, 32 N.J.L. 504 (N.J. 1866), the third case cited by the
court, involved a suit of a contractor against the water commissioners of Jersey City,
New Jersey. Brown alleged that the commission refused to perform under a contract
hiring Brown to lay submerged pipe across the Hackensack river. The enabling state
1092 [Vol. 16
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The court's next pronouncement of the employer-employee rela-
tionship occurred in Florida Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hart.54
Hart alleged that he was elected secretary of the insurance company
for a definite period of time and had been fired.5 5 To support his allega-
tions, Hart testified at trial that no information was given him that the
position was temporary. 5 Hart proffered no evidence to support his al-
legations that he was elected secretary at a salary of $200.00 per
month until the next annual meeting. The court had little trouble con-
cluding that Hart's lack of evidence was fatal to his claim. 57
I In 1934, the supreme court decided the case of Knudsen v.
Green."8 Knudsen alleged that he had an oral agreement with the de-
statute authorized the water commission, to enter into contracts for the pipe project.
The statute set forth specific criteria concerning the particular manner in which con-
tracts were to be advertised for and made. The statute further mandated that the con-
tracts be in writing and that three copies were to be deposited with the controller of
Jersey City and one retained by the commissioners. The commissioners subsequently
passed a resolution authorizing that a contract be drawn up to utilize Brown as a pipe
laying contractor. However, prior to the actual contract being drawn, the commission-
ers rescinded the resolution. At trial a jury found for Brown and awarded damages. On
appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed. The court reasoned that the resolu-
tion was not a binding contract but only an authorization to begin negotiations for a
contract. Furthermore, the court held that until there was an actual offer and accept-
ance, then either party was at liberty to withdraw from the negotiations. Thus, the
court viewed the resolution only as a direction to the commission's engineer and attor-
ney to prepare a contract for the pipe work and to submit the agreement to the com-
mission for its approval before being executed. Finally, the court concluded that the
commission's failure to pass a resolution approving the agreement signified that they
did not consent to the agreement.
Shaw v. Woodbury Glass Works, 18 A. 696 (N.J. 1889), the final case cited by
the court, involved the hiring of a workman for a definite period of time. The court
concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove the agreement because neither the rate of
wages nor the location of work had been agreed upon. The court reasoned that no
agreement existed and that this was merely negotiations in contemplation of an
agreement.
54. 75 So. 528 (Fla. 1917).
55. 1d. at 529.
56. Id. at 532. This suggested that if Hart was not temporary, then he had a
definite term of employment.
57. Id. The court noted that Hart's failed to proffer any evidence through the
testimony of witnesses, the minutes of the board of directors or the charter or by-laws
of the company. The court was quick to note that if Hart had come forward with this
evidence, it would have supported his claim for wrongful discharge. Id. It seems clear
that this case stands not so much as an expansion of the employment at-will doctrine as
it does on how to prove a wrongful discharge case.
58. 156 So. 240 (Fla. 1934).
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fendant for employment as captain and master of a house boat. 59 The
duration of the alleged agreement was unspecified.60 After Knudsen re-
signed from his current employment, Green refused to employ him and
hired another person to serve as captain.6" The trial court found that
Green's actions entitled Knudsen to recover only $300.00 for the first
month's employment.62 The court reasoned that because the amount in
dispute was only $300.00, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dis-
missed the case.63
The supreme court reversed the circuit court and held that the
court did have jurisdiction. The court went on to resolve the dispute
and found that a contract existed but that it did not bind the parties
after the first month since the duration was indefinite. Accordingly, the
court held the relationship to be terminable at-will despite the fact that
the authority relied upon by the supreme court strongly militated
against a finding of at-will employment." ' In short, one case indicated
that no specific term of employment needed to be agreed upon in order
to establish a definite term if the custom of the trade implied a term of
employment. 65 The second case held that a jury could infer a yearly
59. Id. at 241. Knudsen was employed as a mate on a vessel of the Standard Oil
Company at the time of the hiring. He had a definite annual salary and benefits in the
form of a retirement and other bonuses.
60. Id.
61. Id. Green assured Knudsen that Knudsen would not regret leaving Standard
Oil. Moreover, Green offered Knudsen a monthly salary of $300.00. Knudsen, relo-
cated to Miami based upon those representations in October, 1930, and remained there
until April, 1931 when Green repudiated the agreement. Thereafter, Knudsen at-
tempted to obtain his former position at Standard Oil but was refused reemployment.
62. Id. Knudson alleged that his damages were $15,000.00. Knudsen based this
amount on the monies he lost as a result of terminating his employment with Standard.
Once the trial court found that the damages were only $300.00, it dismissed the case
without further action.
63. Knudsen, 156 So. at 242.
64. Id. Interestingly, the court never cited to any of its earlier decisions in
Chipley or Savannah, F & W Ry., as support for this proposition. Rather, the court
relied upon another series of cases from other jurisdictions as precedent. Most of the
interpretations given by the supreme court were in fact strained and ignored other per-
tinent discussions in the cases.
65. In Odom v. Bush, 53 S.E. 1013 (Ga. 1906), the court interpreted a Georgia
statute that provided that a hiring of indefinite duration could be terminated at the will
of either party. Yet, the court wrote that: "Where a contract of hiring is made with
reference to a general custom or business usage, which enters into and becomes a part
of the agreement, the contract is not, of course, indefinite as to its duration the custom
and usage fixes the term of the engagement." Id. at 1016.
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hiring even if there was no specific evidence to support that inference. 66
The third case involved an employee who remained willing and able to
perform his service contract and who was entitled to recover that por-
tion of his unpaid salary.67 The last case pertained to an expressed pro-
vision of an employment contract which evidenced a definite term of
employment.6 8 However, the contract could be terminated so long as a
The court's statement certainly suggests a definite term of employment need not
be explicitly agreed upon by the parties if the plaintiff can show by evidence that the
custom or trade implies a certain term of employment which would become part of the
employment contract. Even more significant, is the fact that the Georgia court ac-
knowledged that wages payable for a stipulated period raised a presumption that the
hiring was for that period. As a result, even if no term of employment was stated a
definite term employment could still exist. On the other hand, if the proof indicates
that the contract was for a longer term, the mere reservation of wages for a lesser
period would not control. In other words, a plaintiff could be paid on a monthly basis
but still have a contract for a year if the evidence supported this conclusion. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court seemed to ignore this portion of the opinion in reaching its conclu-
sion. Under this analysis, if Knudsen proVed that the industry standard of $300.00 per
month implied a longer term of employment, he would have been successful in his
claim. At the very minimum, if the Florida Supreme Court -followed through with the
Odom rationale, the remand should have also allowed Knudsen to plead and prove the
claim, if possible.
66. Clark v. Ryan, II So. 22 (Ala. 1892). Similarly, the court's reliance on
Clark is misplaced. In that case, the Alabama Supreme Court relied upon Wood's
treatise to state the employment at-will doctrine. See supra note 19. The court, how-
ever, approved the trial court's jury instruction that read if the jury did not believe that
Ryan's employment was for a month, then a reasonable construction was that it was
for a year. It seems clear that this holding is contrary to a finding of at-will employ-
ment. Recently, the Alabama Supreme Court recognized a limited exception to the at-
will doctrine. For a discussion of the employment at-will doctrine in Alabama, see
James W. Lampkin 11, Comment, Employment At Will: The Time has Come For
Alabama To Embrace. Public Policy As An Exception To The Rule Of Employment
At Will, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 372 (1989).
67. Cleveland v. Towle, 106 So. 60 (Ala. 1925). In Cleveland, the plaintiff sued
after being, fired. A jury found for the plaintiff and the Alabama Court of Appeals
reversed the verdict. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
held that where an employee has a contract for services to be performed and was dis-
charged without fault on his part, he is entitled to recover his salary if he remains
ready to perform.
68. Derry v. Board of Educ., 61 N.W. 61 (Mich. 1894). In Derry, the plaintiff
signed an agreement with the school board to teach for the following school year. The
contract provided an express clause that allowed the school board to discharge the
plaintiff upon one weeks written notice. When the board exercised that option, plaintiff
sued. In a brief opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the dismissal based upon
the clear express contractual language of the agreement. Accordingly, this holding did
17
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week's notice was given.69
Twenty one years later, the supreme court firmly cemented the at-
will doctrine in Florida jurisprudence in Wynne v. Ludman Corp.70
Wynne's complaint alleged a definite term employment contract. It fur-
ther alleged that Wynne's employment had been held over for an addi-
tional year under the prior terms. At trial, Wynne candidly testified
that his employment was not for a definite time and that he could be
terminated at any time.71 Thus, his testimony did not support the alle-
gations of his complaint and in fact proved the appellee's allegations.'
The court, relying on its decisions in Savannah, F. & W. Railway Co.'"
and Knudsen'7" reiterated its holdings in order to uphold the
termination.75
IV. THE GROWTH OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
Faced with a growing number of unconscionable discharges, sev-
eral courts began to create exceptions to the employment at-will doc-
trine. One of the recognized exceptions is the discharge in violation of
public policy. Under this doctrine, the courts allow recovery in tort for
employees who are fired for refusing to violate a clear mandate of pub-
lic policy. 76 The problem with this precept lies in the fact that its devel-
opment has been erratic and not always without contradictions." Even
those who support the doctrine agree that the "Achilles Heel" of excep-
tion is in determining what constitutes public policy.78 Still, several
not deal with an at-will situation but the interpretation of clear and unambiguous con-
tractual language.
69. Id.
70. 79 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1955).
71. Id. at 691.
72. Id.
73. 31 So. 246 (Fla. 1901).
74. 156 So. 240 (Fla. 1934).
75. The result in Wynne is not as troubling as the court's other holdings because
Wynne's complaint and testimony were completely contradictory.
76. See Giuseppe, supra note 22, at 754. Before applying the public policy excep-
tion most courts require that the plaintiff show more than a mere personal interest in
retaining their employment. The employer's actions must harm not only the plaintiff
but also society as a whole by circumventing a specific statutory pronouncement. Peck,
supra note 17, at 263.
77. See Weiss, supra note 22, at 1121.
78. See Giuseppe, supra note 22; McGuinness, supra note 12, at 232 (the thresh-
old question to be addressed in a wrongful discharge case premised upon public policy
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courts have been able to formulate a workable definition of public pol-
icy. Some courts hold that public policy may be found in legislation,
administrative rules, regulations or judicial decisions. 79 Other courts
find public policy within a professional code of ethics.80 Certainly, it is
beyond dispute that once a legislature enacts a statute prohibiting cer-
tain conduct, that conduct is against public policy.8
exception is whether or not a sufficient expression of public policy is alleged); Peck,
supra note 17, at 255 (many courts recognize rather ethereal public policies not to be
readily found in legislation, constitutions, or judicial opinions); Bouffard, supra note
53; Debra Greenberg, Note, Employment At Will: A Proposal To Adopt The Public
Policy Exception In Florida, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 614, 629 (1982) (court have long
recognized that public policy of one generation might not be the public policy of an-
other); Robert B. Gidding, Comment, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.: Is the
Public Policy Exception to the At Will Doctrine a Bad Omen for the Employment
Relatiom:hip?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1187, 1193 (1981) ("not all sources express a
clear mandate of public policy . . . absent legislation, other sources claimed to be a
source of' public policy would be subject to case by case judicial determinations");
Grow, supra note 22, at 201 (supreme court neglected to determine the proper scope of
Arkansas's public policy exception); David J. Monz, Comment, Wrongful Discharge
Law In Connecticut. Time For A Workers' Bill Of Rights Through Enumerated
Prohibitions Legislation, 21 CONN. L. REV. 467, 477 (1989) (the degree to which pub-
lic policy overrides at-will employment rights generally varies depending on the policies
implicated); Comment, Employment At Will, supra note 63, at 380 (the concept of
public policy is vague and subject to dispute when applied).
Some courts encounter little problem in defining the scope of public policy. See,
e.g. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)
(public policy must be well defined and dominant and is to be ascertained by reference
to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interest); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (discharge moti-
vated by bad faith or malice or based upon retaliation is not in the best interest of the
economic system or the public good); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d
505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (public policy may be found in legislation; administrative rules,
regulations or decisions and judicial decisions and in certain instances a professional
code of ethics).
Public: policy is also described as:
community common sense and common conscience, extended and applied
throughout the state to matters of public morals, health, safety, welfare
and the like; it is that general and well-settled public opinion relating to
man's plain, palpable duty to his fellowmen, having due regard to all cir-
cumstances of each particular relation and situation.
BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1231 (6th ed. 1990).
79. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
80. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
81. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985). The
Wagenseller court also noted that a majority of states have either recognized some
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While the full parameters of the doctrine are unclear, three defini-
tive types of cases have evolved. First, are those cases where the firings
were precipitated by the employee's refusal to obey directions of the
employer to commit a crime or act contrary to public policy, or where
the employee refused to give false testimony at a trial or administrative
hearing.8" The second area pertains to those cases involving whistle-
blowers or employees refusing to violate a code of ethics.". The last
form of public policy exception or expressed a willingness to consider it under appropri-
ate circumstances. The court concluded that while the interests of the economic system
will be served by allowing employers to terminate employees for good cause or no
cause, the interests of society will be served if employers are prevented from terminat-
ing employees for a cause that is morally wrong. Id. at 1031. Administrative rules and
regulations can also be said to reflect public policy since all have their genesis in the
statute's enabling statute absent any excess of delegated legislative authority.
82. Tritle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1991) (discharged for
reporting FAA safety violations); Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Lab., Inc., 552 So.
2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d
1327 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1985); Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (refusal to serve intoxicated patron in violation of state dram
law); Laws v. Aetna Fin. Co., 667 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (refusal to "pack
loans" in violation of federal truth in lending law and state small loan regulation law);
Sides v. Duke Hosp., 325 S.E.2d 818, (N.C. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 335 S.E.2d 13
(1985) (refusal to commit perjury); DeRose v. Putnam Mgt. Co., 496 N.E.2d 428
(Mass. 1986) (refusing to testify falsely against fell ow employee.at -employer's de-
mand); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986),
affd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (1987) (refusing to violate Clean Air Act); Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984) (en .banc) (fired for instituting account-
ing practices to insure compliance with federal corrupt practices anti-bribery statute);
Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 872 (Wash. 1984) (false testimony in deposi-
tion in lawsuit of another against employer); Melchi v.. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 597
F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (discharge for reporting violationsto Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982) (em-
ployee discharged to prevent testimony before grand jury or any subsequent criminal
trial); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (refusal to violate
anti-trust laws and consent decree); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 265
N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (employee discharged for refusing to alter results
of tests on pollution control reports); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 568 P.2d 764
(Was. 1977) (en banc) (refusal to commit perjury); Petermann v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (refusal to commit perjury before state
legislature).
83. City of Miami v. Coil, 546 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (dis-
charge for reporting malfeasance, misfeasance and neglect of duty); Boyle v. Vista
Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (filing complaint with FDA
where employer violated lens testing regulations); Maus v. National Living Ctrs., Inc.,
633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (reporting inadequate patient care and neglect
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area entails the employee's exercise of a statutory right.84 In all cases
in which plaintiffs prevailed, the courts recognized that the public's col-
lective good outweighed the employer's right to fire. For example, the
North Carolina courts recognized this premise when creating an excep-
tion to the at-will doctrine.
In Sides v. Duke Hospital,"5 the plaintiff was employed as a nurse
anesthetist for more than eleven years prior to her dismissal.86 While
on duty, Sides refused to follow a doctor's order to administer anesthet-
ics to a patient because she thought the drug would harm the patient.87
The doctor administered the drug and the patient suffered permanent
brain damage.88 The patient's estate filed suit alleging medical mal-
practice. 89 Sides was deposed in the malpractice case but before she
gave her deposition, several doctors at Duke and Duke's attorneys told
her not to testify about all she observed. Some of the doctors warned
her that she would be "in trouble" if she did so.90 Despite these warn-
of patients); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Il. 1981)
(relying on general criminal statutes for proposition that public policy favors citizen
crime fighters); Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Geary v.
United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Penn. 1974) (employee complaint over defec-
tive casings).
84. Scott v. Otis Elevator, 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1991) (discharged for filing
workers' compensation claim); Hummer v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 573 So.
2d 135 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct App. 1991) (discharged for HIV treatment); Aszkenas v.
J.B. Robinson Jewelers, Inc., 560 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (fired for
serving on federal jury); Neidhart v. Pioneer Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 498 So. 2d 594
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (responding to jury summons); Blangy v. State, 481 So.
2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1330 (1986) (discharge be-
cause of length of jury duty); Kilpatrick v. Delaware County Soc'y for Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, 632 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (OSHA prohibits discharge of
employees in reprisal for exercising rights under the Act); Novosel v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (dismissal in violation of first amendment guarantee);
Mobley v. Southern Plasma Corp., 366 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (dis-
charge for collective bargaining activities); Montalvo v. Zamora, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401
(5th Dist Ct. App. 1970) (implied action under minimum wage statute).
85. 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
86. Id. at 820.
87. Id. at 821.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 821. Such a recommendation by counsel in Florida
would certainly violate the rules of professional conduct. See RULES REGULATING THE
FLORIDA BAR 4-3.4(a), which states that a lawyer shall not "[u]nlawfully obstruct an-
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ings, Sides testified "fully and truthfully" at the depositions and again
at trial.9  The trial resulted in an award of $1,750,000 for the patient."
Concerned that her testimony in the case might cause her difficulties in
her work with some of the doctors at Duke, Sides asked her supervisor
to inform her of any complaints about her work so that she could ad-
dress them.9 3 Thereafter, several doctors displayed hostility towards
Sides and refused to work with her.94 Within a short period of time,
Sides' supervisor informed Sides of her inadequate job performance,
but refused to give her any specific examples. Sides was told that her
performance would be monitored closely for the next three months.9'
Less than three weeks later, Sides was discharged. 9 Sides brought an
action for wrongful discharge and for wrongful interference with her
employment contract.97 The trial court dismissed the suit..
In a unanimous decision, the court of appeals reversed the dismis-
sal of the claims and held that Sides stated an action for relief under
both contract and tort theories.9 8 The court noted that there was a
strong public interest in preventing the obstruction of justice.99 As a
91. Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
92. Id. The defendant doctor viewed Sides as the person who caused them to lose
the case.
93. Id. The chief nurse refused to do this.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 821-22.
97. Id. at 822.
98. Id. at 825-28.
99. Id. at 823-24. Speaking for a unanimous court, Judge Phillips wrote:
These offenses are an affront to the integrity of our judicial system, an
impediment to the constitutional mandate of the courts to administer jus-
tice fairly, and a violation of the right that all litigants in this State have
to have their cases tried upon honest evidence fully given. Indeed, as every
citizen of ordinary intelligence must surely know, under-our law before any
witness can testify in any civil or criminal case he must solemnly affirm or
swear that the evidence given by him "shall be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth." [W]e ...believe that to deny that an en-
forceable claim has been stated in this instance would be a grave disservice
to the public and the system of law that we are sworn to administer, no
principle of which requires that civil immunity be given to those who
would defile or corrupt it.
Id. (citations omitted). Section 90.605, Florida Statutes, requires that before testifying
a witness must take an oath or affirmation that he will testify truthfully. FLA. STAT. §
90.605 (1991). If a witness refuses to either swear or affirm that he will tell the truth,
he will not be allowed to testify. CHARLES W. EHRHARDT. FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 605.1
1100 [Vol. 16
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result, the court concluded that no employer could deprive an at-will
employee of his livelihood without civil liability because he refuses to
testify untruthfully or incompletely in a court case. The court opined:
".If we are to have law, those who so act against the public interest
must be -held accountable for the harm inflicted thereby; to accord
them civil immunity would incongruously reward them for lawlessness
at the unjust expense of their victims." 100
Of equal importance was the action of the Texas Supreme Court
in Sabine.Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck.10' Hauck was discharged by his
employer for -refusing to pump the bilges of the employer's boat into
the water which would be a violation of federal law.102 He subsequently
sued his employer alleging wrongful discharge. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the employer and the court of appeals reversed
the judgment. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed.' 0 3 The supreme
court opined that in the intervening ninety seven years since the court
first recognized the at-will doctrine in. Texas, the employer-employee
relationship and changes in American society required that public pol-
icy, as expressed in the laws of Texas and the United States, required a
very narrow exception to the doctrine.'04 The court was sure to note
that the narrow exception covers only the discharge of an employee for
the sole reason that an employee refused to perform an illegal act. 1 5
The concurring justices applauded the decision, characterizing the at-
will doctrine as a "relic of industrial times, conjuring up visions of
sweat shops described by Charles Dickens," and concluded that the
doctrine "belongs in a museum, not in our law."' 06
(2d ed. 1984).
100. Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
101. 687 &W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
102. Id. at 734-35. Hauck saw a sign stating that this practice was illegal. He
called the Coast Guard to confirm the illegality of the procedure. After receiving con-
firmation that the act was illegal, he refused to do what the employer ordered. He was
then fired. Id.; see Comment, Labor Law-Texas Employment At-Will-A State Position
On Public Policy Comes Into Sharper Focus. Vasquez v. Bannworths, 707 S. W2d 886
(1986), 12 1'. MARSHALL L. REV. 241 (1986).
103. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 734-35.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 736.
106. Id.; Comment, supra note 102, at 249. Justice Kilgarlin then observed:
Our duty to update this doctrine is particularly urgent when the doctrine is
used as leverage to incite violations of our state and federal laws ....
Allowing an employer to require an employee to break a law or face termi-
nation cannot help but promote a thorough disrespect for the laws and
1992] 1101
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V. OF CONTRACT OR TORT
Perhaps the most difficult problem facing the Florida Supreme
Court in dealing with an exception to the at-will employment doctrine
is whether to treat the exception as a breach of contract or as a tort.
Florida courts take a strict doctrinal approach to employer-employee
relations and couch their concern in terms of a reluctance to interfere
with the inherent right of the employer and employee to contract.""
This strict doctrinal approach and the courts' refusal to allow an action
under tort theory suggests that the Florida courts are more comfortable
in defining the employment relationship under traditional contract the-
ory. This may be the result of the courts' perception that contract the-
ory provides a bright line basis for defining the relationship. Thus, the
court simply looks to see if the relationship includes an exchange of
mutual promises, consideration and mutuality.10 8 If any one element is
missing, there is no relationship.10 9
legal institutions of our society . . . . The court admittedly carves out but
one exception to employment-at-will, . . . but our decision today in no way
precludes us from broadening the exception when warranted in a proper
case.
Id.
107. Hartley, 476 So. 2d at 1329. One commentator astutely observes: "It is as
though the turn of the century values concerning formalism, laissez-faire economics,
stare decisis and deference to legislatures . . . still predominate in the South." Susan
K. Datesman, Note, Sides v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Exception to the Em-
ployment-At-Will Rule, 64 N.C. L. REv. 840, 841 (1986).
108. For a good review of the doctrinal basis under contract theory and the ne-
cessity of change, see Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Duty To Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-28
(1980). One commentator suggests that contract theory could be properly applied to
the public policy at-will exception the same as if the employer attempted to enforce an
illegal condition in a term employment contract. If the court would find void as against
public policy a condition allowing abusive conduct in a contract term, that court should
not condone the abusive conduct simply because an at will contract is for an indefinite
period of time. Illegal conduct is illegal conduct. J. Wilson Parker, North Carolina
Employment Law After Coman: Reaffirming Basic Rights In The Workplace, 24
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 905, 931 (1989).
109. 1 believe that the true reasons for this strict doctrinal approach are set forth
in Justice Ryan's dissent in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
The deteriorating business climate in this State is a topic of substantial
interest. A general discussion of that subject is not appropriate to this dis-
sent. It must be acknowledged, however, that Illinois is not attracting a
great amount of new industry and business and that industries are leaving
24
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Tort theory, on the other hand, attempts to reconcile the poten-
tially conflicting sets of interests present in an at-will relationship.11
Courts analyzing the at-will doctrine as a tort, balance the employer's
interest in the ability to evaluate its workforce with a sufficient degree
of flexibility to discharge an unproductive employee against the em-
ployee's interest in freedom from discharge for exercising legal rights
or refusing to violate the law.' Once the courts are committed to pro-
tecting the employee's interest in the balance, the logical result is to
utilize a third interest, the public interest, in the promotion of state
public policy. 112 In the traditional form of contract based at-will em-
ployment, the Florida Supreme Court recognizes only one of these in-
terests, that of the employer's, by granting the employer the absolute
right to discharge an employee at-will for good cause, no cause or even
morally bad cause." 3
In contrast to Florida's strict doctrinal approach, contract based
exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine have evolved from the
obligations of the parties arising out of their relationship." 4 While
the State at a troublesome rate. I do not believe that this court should
further contribute to the declining business environment by creating a
vague concept of public policy which will permit an employer to discharge
an unwanted employee, one who could be completely disruptive of labor-
management relations through his police spying and citizen crime-fighting
activities, only at the risk of being 'sued in tort not only.for compensatory
damages, but also for punitive damages.
Id. at 885.
110. See Bouffard, supra note 53, at 78-79. The three interest are the employer's
interest, the employee's interest, and the public interest.
I11. Id.
112. 1d. The courts, therefore, use the public interest to resolve the conflict be-
tween the employer and the employee. The overall objective is to balance all three
interests without favoring one set of interests over another. Id.
113. Id.; accord Smith v. Piezo Tech. and Prof. Adminis., 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla.
1983); DeN~arco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), affid, 384 So. 2d 1253 (1980).
114. See Bouffard, supra note 53, at 80. In an insightful fashion, Gilmore argues
that over the past forty years, we have seen the effective dismantling of the formal
system of classical contract theory.
Speaking descriptively, we might say that what is happening is that con-
tract is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of tort. Until the general
theory of contract was hurriedly run up late in the nineteenth century, tort
had always been our residual category of civil liability. As the contract
rules dissolve, it is becoming so again. It should be pointed out that the
theory of tort into which contract is being reabsorbed is itself a much more
25
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Florida courts assess liability for breach of an expressed contract,11 5
they refuse to find liability for breach of a policy manual " ' or through
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.1 1 7
expansive theory of liability than was the theory of tort from which con-
tract was artificially separated a hundred years ago.
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
115. Vienneau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1989); Maines v. Davis, 491 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Grap-
pone v. City of Miami Beach, 495 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
116. Lurton v. Muldon Mtr. Co., 523 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(policy manual expressing dismissal only for just cause not enforceable). Contra Staggs
v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 486 A.2d 798 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 303 493
A.2d 349 (1985) (provisions in a policy manual which limit the employer's discretion to
terminate an indefinite employment or that set forth a required procedure for termina-
tion may if properly expressed and communicated to the employee become a contrac-
tual undertaking by the employer that are enforceable by the employee). Accord Wool-
ley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980),
where the court held:
that [an] employer statements of policy such as the Blue Cross Supervi-
sory Manual and Guidelines, can give rise to contractual rights in employ-
ees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy state-
ments would create contractual rights in the employee ....
Id. at 892. Thus, where an employer establishes a company policy to discharge for just
cause only, pursuant to certain procedures, makes the policy known to the employee
and committed itself to abide by its policy, the relationship is not terminable at will.
117. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); K Mart Corp. v.
Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987); Cook v. Alexander & Alexander of Conn., Inc.,
488 A.2d 1295 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1985); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364
N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
Although not all courts recognize exceptions or limitations to the employ-
ment at will doctrine, courts in thirty-two states have adopted public policy
exceptions, eleven states have applied the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and twenty-nine states have used employee handbooks to find con-
tractual limitations on terminations. A total of thirty-nine states now em-
ploy one or more theories to qualify the employment at will doctrine.
Bullock v. Automobile Club of Mich., 444 N.W.2d 114, 119 (Mich. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990) (quoting Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A
Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 13-14 (1988)).
The Florida Courts reject the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as it
pertains to at-will employment contracts. See, e.g. Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 553 So. 2d 1165 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029
(1990); Muller v. Stromberg, Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1982). Conversely, the courts are quick to imply a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its commercial contracts. See Coira v. Florida Medical Ass'n, 429 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983), and cases cited therein. See also FLA. STAT. § 671.203 (1989)
26
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VI. THE TREND CONTINUES
A. Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Laboratories, Inc."8
Sandra Jarvinen was employed by HCA Allied Laboratories.
HCA terminated Jarvinen after she responded to a subpoena and testi-
fied truthfully against HCA at trial. 119 As a result, Jarvinen sued HCA
and two other defendants in a three count complaint. Count I, pertain-
ing only to HCA, alleged that HCA terminated Jarvinen in retaliation
for her -testimony.120 She further alleged that her dismissal violated
public policy for witnesses to testify truthfully, without coercion, intim-
idation or threat of adverse consequences.12' Subsequently, the trial
(every contract or duty within the code imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "[e]very contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its en-
forcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). It is clear that
nothing in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts suggests that it should not apply to
employment contracts. See Parker, supra note 108.
118. 552 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
119. larvinen, 552 So. 2d at 242. Jarvinen was subpoenaed to testify in the trial
of Dr. Raul Romaguera, a physician who was suing HCA. The allegations in Jarvinen's
complaint alleged that the testimony was truthful and that HCA viewed Jarvinen's
testimony as detrimental to its defense of the Romaguera lawsuit.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.410(e) provides that the "[f]ailure by any person without ade-
quate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be deemed a contempt of the




(I) Whoever makes a false statement, which he does not believe to be true,
under oath in an official proceeding, in regard to any material matter shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Knowledge of the materiality of the statement is not an element of this
crime, and the defendant's mistaken belief that his statement was not ma-
terial is not a defense.
Nessmith v. State, 472 So. 2d 1248, 1252 n.6 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985), rev.
denied, 484 So. 2d 10 (1986).
"Official proceeding" means a proceeding heard, or which may be or
is required to be heard, before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or
the other governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence
under oath, including any referee, master in chancery, hearing examiner,
commissioner, or other person taking testimony or a deposition in connec-
1105S19921
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court dismissed the suit and entered judgment for HCA.122 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision. The court
held that Jarvinen could not state a cause of action since she was an
employee at-will.123 Nonetheless, Judge Glickstein, in a specially con-
curring opinion, urged the Florida Supreme Court to address the issue
tion with any such proceeding.
Id. at 1252 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 837.011(1) (1985)).
FLA. STAT. § 837.021 (1991) states:
(1) Whoever in one or more official proceedings, willfully makes two or
more material statements under oath when in fact two or more of the
statements contradict each other is guilty of a felony of the third degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
FLA. STAT. § 914.13 (1991) states:
When a court of record has reason to believe that a witness or party who
has been legally sworn and examined or has made an affidavit in a pro-
ceeding has committed perjury, the court may immediately commit the
person or take a recognizance with sureties for his appearance to answer
the charge of perjury. Witnesses who are present may be recognized to the
proper court, and the state attorney shall be given notice of the
proceedings.
FLA. STAT. § 914.14 (1991) states:
(1) It is unlawful for any person who is a witness in a proceeding instituted
by a duly constituted prosecuting authority of this state to solicit, request,
accept, or agree to accept any money or anything of value as an induce-
ment to:
(a) Testify or inform falsely; or
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing.
(2) Any person violating any provision of this section shall be guilty of a
felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083,
or s. 775.084.
FLA. STAT. § 914.22 (1991) states:
(1) A person who knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, or threat-
ens another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct
toward another person, or offers pecuniary benefit or gain to another per-
son, with intent to cause or induce any person to:
(a) Withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object,
from an official investigation or official proceeding;
(c) Evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or
to produce a record, document or other object, in an official investigator or
an official proceeding;
(d) Be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been
summoned by legal process; or
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presented by Jarvinen. 24 Judge Glickstein viewed the actual issue as
one which concerned whether a cause of action should exist for retalia-
tory discharge for failure to give false testimony. 2 ' His discussion
spoke to those jurisdictions which recognize a narrow public policy ex-
ception for discharged employees who have chosen to testify truthfully
and have consequently lost their jobs." 6
124. Id. at 243. Obviously concerned by the inequity presented in the case, yet
bound by precedent of the supreme court, Judge Glickstein wrote: "I . . . write in the
hope that the Florida Supreme Court will speak to the issue, given the court's concern
for the administration of justice." Id.
At common law perjury, subornation of perjury and intimidation of witnesses were
offenses. The Florida Legislature broadened the perjury prohibition through legislation.
See supra, note 121. Other courts have manifested similar attitudes toward perjury
offenses. See Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 823 ("[tlhese offenses . . . are an affront to the
integrity of our judicial system, an impediment to the constitutional mandate of the
courts to administer justice fairly and a violation of all litigants in this state to have
their cases tried upon honest evidence fully given.").
125. Jarvinen, 552 So.2d at 243.
126. Id. Judge Glickstein referred to several cases cited by Jarvinen in her brief,
quoting their rationale but taking no further position on the issue except to indicate
that several other courts created exceptions under these circumstances. See, e.g.,
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Sides
v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (N.C. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 335 S.E.2d 13
(1985); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 568 P.2d 764 (Wash. 1977). Judge Glick-
stein's opinion clearly reflects that he was disturbed by the inequity of the results in
this instance and the necessity to encourage persons to testify truthfully. Unfortunately,
the court passed up the opportunity to expand upon its discussion, or to utilize other
procedural alternatives available to it in order to avoid upholding the trial court's dis-
missal of the complaint. In that regard, the court might have chosen to certify the
question presented in the case to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public
importance. Article Five of the Florida Constitution provides:
(b) Jurisdiction - The supreme court:
(4) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon
a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is certi-
fied by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another district court of
appeal.
(5) May review any order or judgment of a trial court certified by the
district court of appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great public
importance, or to have a great effect on the proper administration of jus-
tice throughout the state, and certified to require immediate resolution by
the supreme court.
FLA. CONST., art V, § 3; see Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987);
accord FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (1991).
Under certification jurisdiction, review by the Florida Supreme Court is discretion-
19921 1107
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B. Bellamy v. Holcomb
More recently, another court proceeding set the stage for the ter-
mination of an at-will employee in Bellamy v. Holcomb.' Karin Bel-
lamy worked as a bookkeeper for Auto Intelligence Devices.'28 Bellamy
brought an auto negligence action which was unrelated to her employ-
ment."'9 The defense attorney in that case issued a subpoena duces, te-
cum for Holcomb's wage and hour records relating to Bellamy. 130
Holcomb refused to comply with the subpoena. The defense attorney
then subpoenaed the company's bookkeeper. The bookkeeper testified
that Holcomb instructed her not to bring or produce Bellamy's person-
ary. Furthermore, since the court of appeal cannot intentionally render a decision
which is in conflict with supreme court precedent, certification would have been the
only viable alternative in order to redress the inequity perpetrated in Jarvinen. The
supreme court notes its preference to this method of review. Speaking to the issue in
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), the supreme court noted:
This is not to say that the District Court of Appeal are powerless to seek
change; they are free to certify questions of great public interest to this
Court for consideration, and even state their reasons for advocating
change. They are, however, bound to follow the case law set forth by this
Court.
Id. at 434.
In the same vein, the case must present some indication of a need for immediate
resolution in addition to a substantive basis for review. Certainly, dismissal from one's
livelihood in lieu of committing perjury satisfies the immediacy requirement. For a
thorough review of the "immediate resolution" standard, see Department of Ins. v.
Teachers Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 1981) (England, J., dissenting). Finally, a
simple majority of the merits panel at the district court of appeal is all that is needed
to certify a question to the supreme court.
Jarvinen subsequently moved the district court of appeal for certification of the
question to the supreme court. The court denied certification on November 21, 1989.
127. 577 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The reported case provides
no facts. Thus, the facts portrayed in this comment are taken from the brief of the
appellant filed before the court of appeal.
128. Appellant's Initial Brief at 1, Bellamy v. Holcomb, 577 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter Appellant's Initial Brief]. Auto Intelligence Devices
is the alter ego of appellee Holcomb.
129. Bellamy, 577 So. 2d at 610; Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 128, at 5.
130. Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 128, at 5; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.410(b)
(providing "[a] subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to pro-
duce the books, papers, documents or tangible things designated therein .... ").
The defense attorney made service of the subpoena duces tecum upon the com-
pany's records custodian on April 14, 1987. No records were produced in response to it.
Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 128, at 5.
1108 [Vol. 16
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nel records.131 The defense attorney issued and served Holcomb's firm
another subpoena duces tecum for a records custodian deposition to be
held at Holcomb's office. On the day of the deposition, the attorney was
informed upon arrival at the office that, the records custodian was out
of town. 132 In response, the trial court in the auto negligence case is-
sued an order to show cause why Holcomb's company should not be
held in contempt of court.' 33 The order further directed that a company
representative appear before the court on April 11, 1988.1'' Holcomb
advised Bellamy after learning that he would be subpoenaed, "They'll
have to find me first to serve me and I'm not easily found."'31 3 To his
surprise, Holcomb was found and the trial judge held him in contempt
for not producing the subpoenaed documents.136 The day following the
court hearing, Holcomb discharged Bellamy. 3 7 Bellamy instituted an
action against Holcomb alleging several different theories of recov-
ery. 138 Holcomb moved to dismiss the suit with prejudice. The trial
court granted Holcomb's motion and Bellamy appealed.' 9
In a per curiam decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeal af-
firmed the dismissal of the lawsuit without further discussion." ° Judge
Polen, in his specially concurring opinion, believed that this question
should be certified to the Florida, Supreme Court as one of great public
131. Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 128, at 5. The bookkeeper testified on
November 17, 1987. Id.
132. Id. The subpoena was returnable'on March 29, 1988.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Appellant's Initial Brief" supra note 128, at 6. Bellamy further alleged that
Wheri'"Holcomb was ordered to show cause, he stated 'that "I have every intention of
firing you." Id.
136. Id.
137. Id Bellamy's brief reflects the following account:
On April 12, 1988, the day after Holcomb appeared in court, Holcomb's personnel
manager approached Bellamy laughing. The following exchange then took place:
Personnel Manager: You know it's coming.
Bellamy: Yes.
Personnel Manager: I have to fire you. I don't know why. I always have to
do the dirty work.
Id. Bellamy's brief indicates that she was a conscientious employee who abided by the
work rules set out in her employee's handbook.
138. Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 128, at 6; Count I involved Breach of
Unilateral Employment Contract; Count II Promissory Estoppel; and Count Ill Tor-
tious Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy. Id.
139. Id.
140. Bellamy, 577 So. 2d at 609.
1992] 1109
31
De Nigris: The Public Policy Exception: The Need to Reform Florida's At-Will
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
importance.1 4 1
VII. THE NEED To REFORM
Workers' rights continue to suffer in Florida. Relying on the
courts' failure to modify the archaic notion that the legislature makes
public policy,1 '12 employers enjoy a premium on continued lawless-
ness. 14 3 Moreover, the rationale for continuing the at-will doctrine is
inconsistent in several aspects. First, the employment at-will doctrine is
a creation of the Florida Supreme Court and not the legislature or
common law. " ' Accordingly, the court is free to modify the doctrine
without legislative action. 14 5 Second, the doctrine of stare decisis is of
141. Id.; Judge Polen's proposed certified question reads as follows:
Should a cause of action be recognized for tortious wrongful discharge
(from employment otherwise terminable at will), in violation of public pol-
icy where an employee is fired because of her participation in a lawsuit
which requires that the employee's earning records be produced by the
employer pursuant to a subpoena?
Id. Conversely, Judge Stone opined in his specially concurring opinion that the certified
question is properly one for legislative determination. Id.
142. See, e.g., Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644,
646 (Fla. 1986) ("of the three branches of government, the judiciary is the least capa-
ble of receiving public input and resolving policy questions based on a societal consen-
sus"); Greenleaf & Crosby Co. v. Coleman., 158 So. 421, 429 (Fla. 1934) ("acts of the
legislature practically determine the policy of the state"); State ex rel. Church v.
Yeats, 77 So. 262, 264 (Fla. 1917) (legislature establishes the public policy of the state
unless restrained by some constitutional authority).
143. Applied to the Jarvinen holding, the court's holding creates a substantial
dilemma: commit the crime of perjury and go to jail, or refuse to commit perjury and
be fired. Alternatively, Jarvinen could refuse to testify and be held in contempt and
sent to jail. Each alternative, is totally unacceptable given the courts' duty to insure the
fair and impartial administration of justice.
The Bellamy holding is equally disturbing because the process utilized by the de-
fense attorney was the civil rules of procedure as established by the supreme court.
Thus, the results in this case now penalize an employee for using, or in Bellamy's case
not using, the rules of civil procedure that were promulgated to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination in every action. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010 (rules shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action).
144. See Chipley v. Atkinson, 1 So. 934 (Fla. 1887); Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v.
Willett, 31 So. 246 (Fla. 1901); Florida Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hart, 75 So. 528 (Fla.
1917); Knudsen v. Green, 156 So. 240 (Fla. 1934); Wynne v. Ludman Corp., 79 So. 2d
690 (Fla. 1955).
145. In County Sanitation Dist. v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n, Local
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little import because the cases in which the supreme court premised its
original adoption of at-will employment were not based on terminations
for refusal to violate the law. 4" Accordingly, the supreme court's con-
Plaintiff's argument that only the legislature can reject the common law
doctrine prohibiting public employee strikes flies squarely in the face of
both logic and past. precedent. Legislative silence is not the equivalent of
positive legislation and does not preclude judicial reevaluation of common
law doctrine. If the courts have created a bad rule or an outmoded one, the
courts can change it.
Id. at 848.
Section 2.01, Florida Statutes, provides:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a
local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the fourth
day of July, 1776, are declared to be in force in this state; provided the
said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the constitution and
laws of the United States and the acts of the legislature of this state.
FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1989). Since the employment at-will doctrine was not part of the
English common law then in effect at that time, the supreme court is free to fashion a
modification. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952), supports this proposition. In
that case, the court wrote:
When the rules of common law are in doubt, or when a factual situation is
presented which is not within the established precedents, we are sometimes
called upon to determine what general principles are to be applied, and in
doing this we, of necessity, exercise a broad judicial discretion. It is only
proper that in such cases we take into account the changes in our social
and economic customs and present day conceptions of right and justice.
When the common law is clear we have no power to change it.
Id. at 423 (emphasis added). Even more compelling, is the fact that the Florida Su-
preme Court has not hesitated in other respects to reject anachronistic common law
concepts. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957)
(abrogating, the municipal, immunity doctrine); Morgenthaler v. First Atlantic Nat'l
Bank, 80 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1955) (adopting American testator intent rule and rejecting
English rule); accord Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
In State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333 (Fla.. 1976), Justice Boyd writing for the court
stated:
Stare decisis is a fundamental principle of Florida Law. It played an im-
portant part in the development of English common law and its importance
has not diminished today. Where an issue has been decided by the Su-
preme Court of the state, the lower courts are bound to adhere to the
Court's ruling when considering similar issues . . . .In the event of a con-
flict between the decision of a District Court of Appeal and this Court, the
decision of this Court shall prevail until overruled by a subsequent decision
of this Court.
Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
146. The doctrine of stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action which should
be faithfully adhered to by the court so as to preserve the integrity of the judicial
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tinued adherence to the at-will doctrine and reluctance to create a lim-
ited exception is an enigma in light of its own declarations. For exam-
ple, in Gilliam v. Stewart,1" 7 the court stated: "We recognize that in
this fast changing world the general welfare requires from time to time
reconsideration of old concepts. When the district courts decide that
ancient precedents should be overruled, we welcome their views and
such should be unhesitantly rendered . ".. . 8 Given those words and
its own precedent, the court's reluctance to administer justice in the
employment relationship is inconsistent and unsupportable. 49 In the
administration of law. Nevertheless, the courts have the power to disregard the force of
judicial precedent in a proper case. 13 FLA. JUR. 2D, Courts and Judges §156. Stare
decisis is not a universal, inexorable command. Id. There are nevertheless occasions
when a departure from it is rendered necessary in order to vindicate plain and obvious
principles of law and to remedy a continued injustice. Id. at § 157. It will not be
applied to factual situations when to do so would defeat justice. In that regard, both
the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have departed from
it to overrule an earlier decision. Id.
Changes in social and economic conditions may compel the extension of legal for-
mulas and the approval of new precedents in order to achieve the administration of
justice. In other words, when the reason for the rule changes, the rule itself should no
longer stand and a new rule in harmony with changed conditions should be recognized.
Id. at § 158.
While it is the function of courts to interpret rather than make law, it
must nevertheless be borne in mind that the common law is not a collec-
tion of archaic, abstract legal principles as the briefs of the defendants
imply-it is a living system of law that, like the skin of a child, grows and
develops customs, practices and necessities of the people it was adopted for
change. The common law had its genesis in customs and practices of the
people, and its genius, as many of the country's greatest jurists and legal
scholars have pointed out, is not only its age and continuity, but its vitality
and adaptability.
Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 827.
147. 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
148. Id. at 594.
149. There are numerous examples where the supreme court and the district
courts of appeal have created judicial remedies or judicially modified common law doc-
trines without any direction from the legislature. See, e.g., Farmer v. City of Fort Lau-
derdale, 427 So. 2d 187 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983) (refusal to submit to
polygraph not grounds to dismiss public employee); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402(a));
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (rejecting contributory negligence and
adopting comparative negligence); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971) (establish-
ing right of wife to recover for loss of husband's consortium), receding from, Ripley v.
Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952); Randolph v. Randolph, I So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1941)
(modifying common law doctrine that gave father superior right to custody of a child);
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same vein, the supreme court's rationale in Hoffman v. Jones,1 50 amply
supports the reasons to place the at-will doctrine with the relics of the
past. In that case, the supreme court abolished the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence and adopted a comparative negligence system. The
court's rationale spoke to the fact that the supreme court judicially
adopted the doctrine of contributory negligence in 1886.151 The court
noted that it exercises broad discretion in changing or modifying a rule
taking into account the changes in our social and economic customs
and the present day conceptions of right and justice. 152 The court's own
words are instructive:
Be that as it may, our own feeling is that the courts should be alive
to the demands of justice. We can see no necessity for insisting on
legislative action in a matter which the courts themselves
originated. . . . It may be argued that any change in this rule
Banfield v. Addington, 140 So. 893 (Fla. 1932) (removing common law exemption of a
married woman from causes of action based on contract or mixed contracts in tort);
Waller v. First Say. & Trust Co., 138 So. 780 (Fla. 1931) (rejecting common law
principle that action for personal injuries abated upon death of tortfeasor); Continental
Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing new
tort of negligent spoilation or destruction of evidence for prospective civil suit).
In Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev. denied,
484 So. 2d 7 (1986), the district court addressed the issue of whether to recognize a
cause of action for negligent retention of hospital records. While not a previously recog-
nized tort in Florida, the court wrote:
To be sure, the tort alleged is not a familiar one. That fact, however,
hardly prevents it being recognized by us. As we are reminded by Profes-
sor Prosser:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and
the progress of the common law is marked by many cases of
first impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to
create a new cause of action, where none has been recognized
before . . . . The law of torts is anything but static, and the
limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear
that the plaintiffis interests are entitled to legal protection
against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the
claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the remedy.
Id. at 1312 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §
I, at 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)); see also Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (adopting Greco inference); Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'g Co., 283 F.
Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir. 1969).
150. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
151. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886).
152. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 434-35.
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should come from the Legislature. No recitation of authority is
needed to indicate that this Court has not been backward in over-
turning unsound precedent in the area of tort law. Legislative ac-
tion could, of course be taken, but we abdicate our own function, in
a field peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider an old
and unsatisfactory court-made rule.' 5"
The court found that the demise of the doctrine of contributory
negligence has been urged by many scholars. Furthermore, the court's
own research indicated that at least sixteen states, as well as several
industrial countries, have adopted some form of comparative negligence
in addition to several industrial countries.1 54 In short, the court
concluded:
[T]here is something basically wrong with a rule of law that is so
contrary to the settled convictions of the lay community ....
[t]he disrespect for law engendered by putting our citizens in a
position in which they feel it is necessary to deliberately violate the
law is not something to be lightly brushed aside; and it comes ill
from the mouths of lawyers, who as officers of the courts have
sworn to uphold the law, to defend the present system by arguing
that it works because jurors can be trusted to disregard that very
law. 155
Unfortunately, these words have little meaning when applied to
the at-will relationship. Indeed, to place an at-will employee in a situa-
tion where she must choose between obstructing justice, committing a
criminal act or loss of employment, engenders that very disrespect that
the court speaks disdainfully of in Hoffman, and is tantamount to an
unconscionable miscarriage, and the destruction of, the administration
of justice.
Fourth, the criminal code of Florida is a legislative pronouncement
of public policy and can be easily and narrowly applied in the employ-
ment at-will context.15 6 Fifth, the Florida Legislature's enactments in-
153. Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
154. Id. at 436. Historically, the doctrine of contributory negligence was adopted
by the courts to protect the essential growth of industries, particularly transportation.
Id. The court also found that the courts created ancillary several doctrines to deal with
the harshness of the doctrine.
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. See FLA. STAT. § 775.012 (1991). This section reads in pertinent part:
The general purposes of the provisions of the code are:
1114 [Vol. 16
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dicate that it is not inimical to modifying the employment at-will doc-
trine.167 For example, in Segal v. Arrow Industries Corp.,5'6 the
employee filed a complaint against his employer seeking damages on
the ground that he was wrongfully discharged because he filed a work-
ers' compensation claim.1 59 The trial court dismissed the action and Se-
gal appealed. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the dis-
charge concluding that no action existed, because Segal was an at-will
employee. In response to this decision, the legislature statutorily over-
ruled Segal the following year. 160 Lastly, entertaining actions based on
a violation of public policy for refusing to commit a criminal act
presents no evidentiary impediments as to proof."6 ' Thus, a judicial
(I) To proscribe conduct that improperly causes or threatens substantial
harm or individual or public interest.
(6) To insure the public safety by deterring the commission of offenses
Id. Under the current state of the law in Florida, an employer could direct an at will
employee to commit murder at the risk of losing his job. While the employer could
certainly be charged with solicitation under section 777.04(2), Florida Statutes (1989),
the employee's discharge from employment nonetheless would be upheld. The thought,
however, at using the criminal statutes as a basis for civil suit in an at will employment
is a question left for another day. Yet, before a criminal statute could be used to imply
a cause of action for civil liability, the plaintiff would have to meet the test set forth in
Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc). In
that case, the court adopted the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), for determining whether a criminal statute implies a private
cause of action. The test as set out by the Court involves a determination by the courts
as to:
(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the
statute was enacted;
(2) whether there is any indication, either explicit or implicit, of a legisla-
tive intent to create or deny such a remedy;
(3) whether judicial implication is consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme; and
(4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law
and of concern to the states, such that a cause of action ought not to be
inferred based solely upon federal law.
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
157. See, e.g., supra note 9.
158. 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
159. Id.
160. FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1991).
161. Even if the court were not inclined to create a broad public policy exception
to at-will employment, it could easily create a narrow exception to pertain only to those
claims which involve an employer requiring an illegal act, or retaliation for using the
1992] 1115
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modification of the at-will doctrine will pose no great impact on the
court system or business relationships. 162
VIII. A PROPOSED STATUTE FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Soon after the Florida Supreme Court modifies the at-will doc-
trine, the Florida Legislature should enact legislation to codify the
court's action. The statute should define what offenses will create a
procedures set forth by the supreme court in litigating a dispute. Accordingly, claims
could be disposed of quickly since a plaintiff. would have to specifically show the crimi-
nal statute that an employer ordered the employee to violate. The standard burden for
allowing a cause of action under this narrow exception would be the test similarly use
to litigate cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In that instance, the plaintiffs burden of
establishing a prima facie case would be met if:
(1) the plaintiff was employed by the employer;
(2) the employer ordered the plaintiff to violate a specific criminal statute;
(3) the employee refused to violate the statute, and;
(4) the employee suffered an adverse employment action by the employer.
If the plaintiff meets this initial showing that the protected conduct was a substan-
tial or motivating reason for discharge, the burden would then shift to the defendant to
show that it would have taken the same adverse employment action in the absence of
the protected conduct. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977); accord Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Eiland v. City
of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987).
Moreover, proving that the same decision would have been justified
...is not the same as proving that the same decision would have been
made. An employer may not, in other words, prevail in a mixed-motive
case by offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that
reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision. Finally, an employer
may not meet its burden in such a case by merely showing that at the time
of the decision it was motivated only in part be a legitimate reason. The
very premise of a mixed-motives case is that a legitimate reason was pre-
sent and indeed the case.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252 (citations omitted).
If the employer meets this burden, then the employee would have to show that the
reason given was pretextual. If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, then the suit is
dismissed.
162. There has been an concern by some courts that a change in the at-will doc-
trine will create confusion and uncertainty in business relationships. See Hartley v.
Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Muller v.
Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Courts so
disposed to this theory imply that existing businesses, or the influx of new businesses to
Florida, will be harmed. To the contrary, since 1980, one year after the enactment of
section 440.205, Florida Statutes, creating a wrongful discharge cause of action for
filing a workers' compensation claim, only twenty six cases have been reported.
1116 [Vol. 16
38
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/3
De Nigris
cause of action, remedies and a statute of limitations. The proposed
statute should state the following:
CHAPTER 91--
House Bill No.
An' act relating to wrongful discharge from employment; creating s.
-, F.S., providing for certain definitions, rights and remedies
with respect to wrongful and retaliatory discharge from employment;
providing for an effective date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida;
Section 1: SHORT TITLE: This act may be cited as the "Florida
Wrongful Discharge From. Employment Act".
Section 2: PURPOSE: The Legislature finds that the stability of its
workforce is indispensable to the state's continued economic growth
and to the vitality of its workers. As'a result, the necessity in maintain-
ing full employment and the interests of the employer to make legiti-
mate business decisions are best served if the discharge of an employee
is regulated under certain circumstances. Accordingly, the Legislature
finds that the discharge of an employee for refusing to commit a crimi-
nal act or for exercising a statutory right specifically granted by law is
against the public policy' of this state. In this respect, the Legislature
declares that the purpose of this act is to establish certain rights and
remedies with respect to wrongful discharge. Except as limited in this
act, employment having no specified term may be terminated at the
will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for
any reason considered sufficient by the terminating party. 163
Section 3: DEFINITIONS: The following definitions apply to this act:
(a) "Constructive Discharge" means the voluntary termination of em-
ployment by an employee because of a situation created by an act or
omission of the employer which an objective, reasonable person would
find so intolerable that voluntary termination is the only reasonable
alternative.16'
(b) "Discharge" includes a constructive discharge as defined in subsec-
tion (a), any other termination of employment including voluntary res-
163. This section allows for a structured balance to meet the needs of employers
to effectively manage and operate a business and in making legitimate business deci-
sions. Furthermore, the Act allows an employer to discharge an unproductive or disrup-
tive with no civil liability at all since the Act protects only those employees for those
enumerated causes of action as set forth in section 4 of the Act. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-902 (1991).
164. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(1) (1991); STEELE V. OFFSHORE SHIPBUILD-
ING. INC., 867 F.2D 1311 (1ITH CIR. 1989).
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ignation under duress or undue influence,"" elimination of the job, lay-
off for lack of work, failure to recall or rehire, and any other cutback in
the number of employees for other than a legitimate business reason.
(c) "Person" includes an individual, association, corporation, joint ap-
prenticeship committee, joint-stock company, labor union, legal repre-
sentative, mutual company, partnership, receiver, trust, trustee in bank-
ruptcy, or unincorporated organization; any other legal or commercial
entity; the state; or any governmental entity or agency. 166
(d) "Employee" means a person who works for another for hire but
does not include:
(i) an independent contractor
(ii) an elected public official or an appointee of an elected public
official;
(iii) a state, county, municipal or civil service public employee al-
ready statutorily protected against unjust discharge;
(iv) a person elected to his employment by:
(a) shareholders, a board of governors or an executive committee;
(v) a member of top level management;
(vi) a person under a fixed term of employment for two or more
years who has agreed in writing to waive his or her rights under the
Act;
(vii) a volunteer serving without any form of compensation;
(viii) an individual working for his or her parents, legal guardian
or spouse;
(ix) an employee on probation, except when such status is used as
165. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(2) (1991).
A voluntary act is an act proceeding from one's own choice or full consent
unimpelled by another's influence. However, an action cannot be voluntary
if it is performed as a result of duress. Duress involves a step beyond mere
illegality and implies that a person has been unlawfully constrained or
compelled by another to perform an act under circumstances which pre-
vent the exercise of free will. In order to show duress, a plaintiff must show
(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another, (2) that cir-
cumstances permitted no other alternative, and (3) that said circumstances
were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party. The plaintiff bears
the burden of creating a fact issue with respect to a claim of duress. How-
ever, duress is not measured by a plaintiff's subjective evaluation of a situ-
ation; rather, a plaintiff must tender objective evidence that the retirement
or resignation was the product of duress.
McLaughlin v. Department of Nat'l Resources, 526 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (citations omitted).
166. FLA. STAT. § 760.02(5) (1991).
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a pretext for the exercise of rights enumerated in section 4 of this Act.
(.x) domestic servants;
(xi) an individual protected against wrongful discharge under a
collective bargaining agreement. 16 7
(e) "Employer" includes any person employing 15 or more employees,
for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the cur-
167. Richard D. Himberger, Comment, Unjust Discharge. Why Nonunion Em-
ployees Need A Just Cause Statute, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 135, 154 (1989).
Particular occupations are not covered by the Act. Elected officials
and their appointees (e.g. city managers) are excluded because of the po-
litical nature of their appointment. Business officials are excluded for simi-
lar reasons.
[In the same vein,] [u]nder state public employee statutes, state and
municipal employees may only be dismissed for just cause. These employ-
ees can be excluded from the Act's coverage.
Id. Similarly, employees covered by collective bargaining agreements are excluded
from coverage since the majority of collective bargaining agreements specifically im-
pose a "just cause" standard for disciplinary action or dismissal. Id.
High level managerial employees are excluded for several reasons. First, they are
in a substantially better bargaining position and are economically compensated for the
risks they bear. Second, they are party to the most sensitive type of strategic business
planning and participate in considerable policy making activity. Id. at 154-55.
The Act generally excludes independent contractors as non-employ-
ees. -It also excludes employees working under fixed-term employment con-
tracts of two years or more who have waived their statutory rights against
unjust dismissal in writing. Two justifications emerge. First, these individu-
als have voluntarily contracted away their statutory rights and should have
to accept responsibility for their contractual decisions. Second, if such em-
ployees are discharged in violation of their contracts, they can sue for
breach. In addition, the Act's fixed-term requirement assures that employ-
ers cannot coerce their employees into signing short-term waivers of just
cause statutory rights.
Volunteer employees, individuals working for their parents, guardians,
or spouses, and domestic servants have been excluded . . . . Volunteer
workers do not receive financial compensation or barter in lieu of such
compensation. Therefore, the available remedies of reinstatement with
back pay or compensatory damages are inappropriate. Family members
and domestic employees are excluded because of the "close personal rela-
tionships" that exist.
Because employers often require a probationary period to determine a
worker's qualifications, this statute excludes all employees who have com-
pleted less than six months of service with their employer . . . . The bur-
den is on the [probationary employee] to show that the employer used the
six month period to mask willful acts of unjust discharge.
Id. at 155-56 (citations omitted).
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rent or preceding calendar year and agent of such a person. '68
(f) "Fringe benefits" means the value of any employer paid vacation
leave, sick leave, medical insurance plan, disability insurance plan, life
insurance plan, and pension benefit plan in force on the date of the
termination. "9
(g) "Good cause" means reasonable, job related grounds for dismissal
based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the
employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason.17°
(h) "Lost wages" means the gross amount of wages that would have
been reported to the Internal Revenue Service as gross income on Form
W-2 and includes additional compensation deferred at the option of the
employee.17 1
(i) "Public policy" means the policy in effect at the time of the dis-
charge concerning the public health, safety, or welfare established by
constitutional provision, statute, administrative rule or pronouncements
of the supreme court;1 72
(j) "Probationary Period" means the initial training period following
hiring not to exceed six months;
(k) "Disciplinary Action" includes demotion, loss of pay, suspension,
reduction in seniority, transfer, denial of promotion, reassignment or
otherwise discriminated against, in regard to his employment with re-
gards to the actions enumerated in section 4 of this Act;1 73
Section 4: ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE. A discipli-
nary action, discharge or constructive discharge is wrongful if it was in
retaliation for:
(a) the employee's refusal to commit an unlawful act or violate a regu-
latory statute or administrative rule or regulation;
(b) the employee's performance of a public obligation;
(c) the employee's exercise of a statutory right;
(d) the employee's testimony before any criminal or civil proceeding,
any administrative proceeding, or any arbitration, whether or not com-
pelled by subpoena;
168. The definition of employer is taken from section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes
(1989). By affixing the lower limit of employer, the Act will not become unduly bur-
densome on small employers and will not omit those employees who require the stat-
ute's protection the most.
169. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(3) (1991).
170. Id. at § 39-2-903(5).
171. Id. at § 39-2-903(6).
172. Id. at § 39-2-903(7); see supra, notes 78-84.
173. FLA. STAT. § 112.532(4) (1991).
1120 [Vol. 16
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(e) the employee's report of any suspected violation of federal, state or
local law made to any federal agency, state officer, department, board,
commission or council of the executive branch or judicial branch of
state or federal government, so long as the report was reasonably made
and in good faith;
(f) reporting of any criminal or any safety violation of the Federal Avi-
ation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301, et.seq., as long as the report was reasona-
bly made and in good faith;
17 4
(g) the initiation of any civil proceeding seeking recovery for personal
injuries; or
(h) where the employer violated the express provisions of its own writ-
ten personnel policy in discharging an employee for the exercise of sub-
divisions (a) - (g); or
(i) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had com-
pleted the employer's probationary period of employment.
Section 5: REMEDIES
The remedy for any adverse employment action as described in section
4 of this Act is limited to the following:
(a) Reinstatement with back pay with interest from the date of discipli-
nary action or discharge;
(b) compensatory damages and/or punitive damages;
(c) removal of any record of the adverse employment action from the
employee's personnel record, file, or any other medium used by the em-
ployer to maintain records of employees;
(e) injunctive relief;
(d) attorney's fees and costs.' 75
174. A provision was specifically included to cover employees who report viola-
tions of the Federal Aviation Act. Its purpose is to cover situations where the courts
have found that no cause of action under that statute existed for employees discharge
for reporting flagrant safety violations of defective aircraft. It allows coverage for em-
ployees not protected by section 112.3187(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), and furthers
the policy of this state to protect its citizens while flying. Accord Tritle v. Crown Air-
ways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1991) (discharged for reporting FAA safety
violations).
175. Section 5 provides for several traditional make whole remedies. One remedy
included is a provision for reinstatement. It could be argued that in a wrongful dis-
charge proceeding which the Act covers, the employee would not desire reinstatement
because the employer-employee relationship will have deteriorated as a result of bad
feelings engendered from the dismissal. On the other hand, this provision is entirely
consistent with remedies available under the National Labor Relations Act, Title VII,
and enumerable other statutes and arbitration awards. The Act will similarly prevent
employer misconduct in making such wrongful dismissals since it provides for the
199211 1121
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Section 6: LIMITATION OF ACTION
(a) An action may only be maintained -under this chapter within 90
days after the date of the adverse employment action or when the ag-
grieved employee reasonably should have known of the adverse employ-
ment action.176
IX. CONCLUSION
The efficacy of the at-will employment doctrine is in serious doubt.
Created by misapplied authority and distortion, the doctrine is treated
as a treasured artifact from the nineteenth century by the Florida
courts. While many courts have taken the forefront in the eradication
or modification of the at-will doctrine, the Florida Supreme Court's un-
yielding loyalty to the doctrine places a premium on unlawful employer
conduct. Consequently, employers have utilized the doctrine as leverage
to violate federal and state laws with impunity. Such a result is both
illogical and intolerable in light of the supreme court's other pro-
nouncements, and the changes in society. Thus, the supreme court
should no longer sanction the discharge by an employer of an employee
who refuses to commit an unlawful act. Furthermore, the district
courts of appeal should recognize the need for change and utilize the
certification procedure to encourage the modification of the rule. Only
award of punitive damages.
Removal of the adverse employment action requires that all evidence of the dis-
missal will be removed from a personnel record since these records will generally follow
an employee from job to job. In addition, where the employee was wrongfully dis-
charged, it is inequitable for the employer to maintain a permanent record indicating
that the employee was a "bad employee." This section does not limit any other reme-
dies in tort where the employer slanders or libels a former employee with a prospective
employer. If anything, it encourages a "blind" recommendation.
Injunctive relief is provided for in order to allow a court to regulate the conduct of
an employer who engages in persistent egregious conduct with respect to its employees.
It is an extraordinary remedy and should only be granted in those cases where the
employer's conduct is truly outrageous.
Attorney's fees and costs should be provided since it encourages plaintiffs to bring
actions against an employer in order to enforce the statute, and encourages members of
the bar to take on cases in order to protect workers' rights.
176. An employer should not have to have a potential cause of action lingering
for several years, as is allowed under a general personal injury statute of limitations.
Thus, section 6 forces a discharged employee to expeditiously bring its claim. This
allows for an expedited resolution of the dispute and limits damages. Of course, an
employee would be required to mitigate his damages under generally accepted princi-
ples of contract.
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in this fashion, will the rule of law prevail over the rule of the market,
and force the King of the Turtles to speak instead of shout.
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